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THE STATE OF MIND REQUIREMENT IN RULE
10b-5 ACTIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
WHITE v. ABRAMS' "FLEXIBLE DUTY
STANDARD"
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the authority of section 10(b)1 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated rule
10b-5 (the Rule) 2 which prohibits fraud'by any person in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. Although the express terms of
sectionf 10(b) and rule lOb-5 do not provide a private remedy, the
federal courts shave firmly established that such a remedy exists.8 The
1. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
2. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, br course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1975). The Securities and Exchange Commission, upon publica-
tion of the rule, stated:
The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only
to brokers and dealers. The new rule [10b-5] closes a loophole in the protection
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or com-
panies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.
SEC See. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). See 1 A. BROMBERO, SEcURrMES
LAW: FRAuD § 2.2(410), at 22.6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERO], for a
descriptive account of the "birth" of rule 10b-5.
3. See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), dismissal afj'd, 328 F.2d 573 (1964);
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). For a discussion of the theories on which
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courts, however, have disagreed considerably in regard to what elements
are essential to establish- liability.4 Of the elements which have been
deemed necessary, the requisite state of mind of the defendant has
proven to be one of the most controversial and difficult aspects of rule
lOb-5 litigation. 5
The fundamental issue in this controversy is whether the defendant
must be shown to have had actual knowledge of the falsity upon which
the action is based. In deciding this issue several distinct and divergent
approaches have been suggested. First, is the approach which applies a
scienter standard. This requires that actual knowledge or reckless disre-
implied liability rests see 1 BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 2.4(1), at 27; Ruder, Texas Gulf
Sulphur-The Second Round, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 430-33 (1968).
4. The requisite state of mind is only one of the elements which must be proven to
sustain a rule lob-5 action. For a discussion of other potential aspects of rule lOb-5
litigation, including privity, materiality, reliance, and causation, see 2 BROMBERG, supra
note 2, at ch. 8.
5. Id. § 8.4(000), at 203. There are several factors which account for the confusion
surrounding the proper standard to be applied in rule lob-5 actions. First, the Supreme
Court has yet to decide a rule 10b-5 action in which it has reached the state of mind
issue. But see Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
421 U.S. 909 (1975); note 80 infra. For this reason, and the fact that in the
federal court system stare decisis operates only within and not among the several
circuits, there is no requirement that the circuits agree on and conform to any one
approach to the problem. See Comment, Lanza v. Drexel & Co. and Rule 10b-5:
Approaching the Scienter Controversy in Private Actions, 15 B.C. Ins. & CoM. L. Rnv.
526, 531-32 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Approaching the Scienter Controversy].
Second, there is virtually no legislative guidance to help solve the issue. The entire
congressional debate on § 10(b) is minimal. Bromberg notes that "[o]f nearly a
thousand pages of hearings in the House [on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934], the
combined references to § 10(b) . . . would scarcely fill a page. Much the same is true in
the Senate." 1 BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 2.2 (331), at 22.2-3.
Third, the variety of complex fact situations in which a rule 10b-5 violation may
occur, the types of rule 10b-5 suits which may be brought (e.g., administrative sanctions,
civil suits, injunctions) and the types of defendants which may be charged with a
violation (see text accompanying notes 48-55 infra for a discussion of the distinction
between "primary" and "secondary" defendants), all point to the difficulty in applying a
single state of mind standard. Approaching the Scienter Controversy, supra, 
at 533.
This confusion is understandable given that neither section 10b nor rule 10b-5 specify
a state of mind requirement. Additionally, this confusion is exacerbated by the varying
use of terms employed to. refer to the state of mind requirement. 2 BROMBERG, supra note
2, § 8.4 (503-04), at 204.102; Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 562,
564 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bucklo]; White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 728 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1974). As Professor Bromberg states:
It is apparent that the various words are used at least in part because of habits and
predilections of individual judges who may be thinking of the same thing but de-
scribing it in a different language. Similarly, there is no assurance that two persons
using the same word mean the same thing.
2 BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 8.4 (503), at 204.103.
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gard for the truth of the falsity' be proven to establish liability.7 Second
is the negligence theory, which requires a plaintiff to prove that the
defendant knew or "should have known" of the falsity.8 Third is the
strict liability approach, which requires no showing of knowledge,
either actual or constructive. 9
Recently, the Ninth Circuit, in White v. Abrams,' ° rejected "scienter
or any other discussion of state of mind as a necessary and separate
element of a lOb-5 action.""' In so doing, the court posited what was
purported to be a fourth approach to the state of mind problem, the
"flexible duty standard," which "not only [focuses] on the duty of the
defendant, but [allows] a flexible standard to meet the varied factual
contexts" of 1Ob-5 litigation.' 2
A review of these approaches to the state of mind issue will lead to
the following conclusions. (1) In a complex rule lOb-5 case, involving
multiple defendants, the application of a duty analysis to determine the
defendants' status as either "primary or secondary"' 8 appears to be a
reasonable starting point for determining the liabilities of the various
6. The term "falsity" as used here and throughout this Note means the fraudulent
device, scheme, statement or omission on which the rule lob-5 action is based.
7. See text accompanying notes 15-22 infra, for a discussion of the scienter standard.
The use of the term "scienter" has added considerable confusion to the state of mind
controversy. It has been said that the term is broad enough to encompass "lack of
diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct." SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
However, an inspection of rule lob-5 cases and articles dealing with scienter reveals that
the most popular use of the term is in its traditional or common law sense, that is, actual
knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth of the falsity. For example, the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 526 (1934) provides:
A misrepresentation in a business transaction is fraudulent if the maker
(a) knows or believes the matter to be otherwise than is represented, or
(b) knows that he has not the confidence in its existence or non-existence asserted
by his statement of knowledge or belief, or
(c) knows that he has not the basis for his knowledge or belief professed by his
assertion.
To avoid confusion with the most commonly accepted use of the term and the term as
used by the courts in the leading cases cited herein, scienter, in this article, will be used
in its traditional sense.
8. See text accompanying notes 23-24 infra for a discussion of the negligence
standard.
9. See text accompanying notes 25-3 6 infra.
10. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
11. Id. at 734.
12. Id.
13. See text at notes 48-52 infra for a discussion of the distinction between "primary"
and "secondary" defendants.
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defendants and allocating the rights (indemnity and contribution) 4
among them. (2) Policy considerations underlying federal securities
laws dictate the application of a negligence or "should have known"
standard to primary defendants and a more stringent scienter standard
to secondary defendants. (3) Notwithstanding its language, White v.
Abrams suggests nothing more than a negligence standard in the
guise of a different label, i.e., the "flexible duty standard." The
standard suggested in White was not meant to, and should not have,
application to secondary defendants.
II. TiE STATE OF MIND STANDARDS UNDER RULE lOb-5
A. Scienter
The references to fraud and deceit in clauses 1 and 3 of the Rule'
5
have provided the basis of the claim that scienter, actual knowledge or
reckless disregard for the truth, clearly an element of common law
fraud,"6 is required for liability under the Rule.17 The Second Circuit
decision in Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Company,'8 is cited
for this, the most restrictive approach to rule 10b-5 liability. In that
case, holders of preferred and common stock of Raytheon brought a
class action under section 11 of the Securities Act of 193319 and rule
lOb-5, alleging that they had purchased their shares on the basis of a
misleading prospectus. The district court, finding that the shares pur-
chased by the plaintiffs were not the subject of the prospectus, dismissed
the section 11 claim, and then went on to dismiss the entire complaint
on the theory that rule lOb-5 does not cover the same conduct at which
section 11 is directed. 20 The Second Circuit, in reversing the dismissal of
the 1Ob-5 action, stated:
[W]hen to conduct actionable under section 11 of the 1933 Act, there
is added the ingredient of fraud, then that conduct becomes actionable
under §10(b) of the 1934 Act and the Rule .... 21
14. See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding
and Abetting, Conspiracy, in Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U.P.
L RFv. 597 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder].
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
16. See discussion and authorities cited in Bucklo, supra note 5, at 572, 574-75.
17. See, e.g., Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the
Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 1206, 1207-08 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Mann].
18. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
20. 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), rev'd, 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
21. 188 F.2d at 787 (emphasis added).
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Since a requisite element of common law fraud is scienter, the court
impliedly held that scienter, or action taken knowingly with the intent
to defraud, must be shown to establish a violation of the Rule.22
B. Negligence
The second approach to the state of mind issue, most commonly
termed the "negligence theory," lies somewhere between the extremes
of scienter and strict liability. This approach was taken in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,23 a Second Circuit case in which plaintiffs sought to
enjoin conduct by Texas Gulf Sulphur and certain of its officers, direc-
tors, and employees, and to compel the rescission of securities transac-
tions engaged in by the individual defendants who possessed "inside
information." Although the court applied a standard which it termed
"scienter," by broadening the definition of scienter to include "lack of
diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct, ' 24 it
effectively supplanted traditional or common law scienter with a stan-
dard which would impose liability for negligence.
Reduced to its basic terms, this approach suggests that the state of
mind standard which will suffice for liability is a "should have known"
standard, that is, if the other elements of the action are established,
liability will attach if a defendant knew or should have known of the
falsity. In applying this standard one adheres to traditional principles of
negligence. Thus, the question is whether due care was exercised under
the circumstances; the bench mark is the reasonable person.
C. Strict Liability
Another approach suggests that to establish liability under rule IOb-
5, it is only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions, such as a
material misstatement of fact.2 5 Such an approach calls for the applica-
tion of a standard at the end of the state of mind spectrum opposite from
the scienter standard. Under this approach liability is imposed on a no-
fault basis. Although not widely accepted, this standard has found
Support.
Ellis v. Carter26 and Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith,27 two Ninth
22. Id.
23. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
24. Id. at 855.
25. See, e.g., Stevens v. Vowel], 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965).
26. 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
27. 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
154 [Vol. 9
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Circuit cases, are often cited for this approach to the state of mind
issue.28 The Ellis court rejected the notion set forth in Fischman that
proof of common law fraud or scienter must be shown.29 In so holding,
the court stated:
We disagree [that a 10b-5 violation requires proof of genuine fraud or
scienter]. Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of "any manipula-
tive device or contrivance" in contravention of rules and regulations as
might be prescribed by the Commission .... Had Congress intended
to limit this authority to regulations proscribing common law fraud, it
would probably have said so. We see no reason to go beyond the plain
meaning of the word "any", indicating that- the use of manipulative or
deceptive devices or contrivances of whatever kind may be forbidden,
to construe the statute as if it read "any fraudulent" devices.3 0
Although this language expressly rejected a traditional scienter require-
ment, it is questionable whether the court meant to imply that strict
liability would be imposed for a material misrepresentation or whether
the state of mind requirement had merely been relaxed to some stan-
dard, not defined, between scienter and strict liability."1
It may be concluded that, notwithstanding the dicta,"2 no court has
yet imposed liability on a strict liability basis. The Ninth Circuit's
position on this issue was made clear in White v. Abrams33 where the
court attempted to clarify the confusion caused by Ellis. In White, the
court ruled that the lower court erred in giving a jury instruction which
imposed strict liability,34 and stated that it is erroneous to construe any
Ninth Circuit decision as creating a standard of strict liability.35 In
Support of its position the court noted:
[T]here is no indication that Congress . . . or . . . the Securities Ex-
change Commission . . . intended that "anyone should be an insurer
28. Bucklo, supra note 5, at 565; BRomBERG, supra note 2, § 8.4 (630), at 204, 242-
43.
29. 291 F.2d at 274.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. For commentary on Ellis, see authorities cited in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724,
730 (9th Cir. 1974).
32. See also, e.g., the following statement in Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th
Cir. 1965):
It is not necessary to allege or prove common law fraud to make out a case under
the statute and rule (10b-5). It is only necessary to prove one of the prohibited
actions suci as" the material misstatement of fact or the omission to state a mate-
rial fact.
Id. at 379.
33. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
34. Id. at 728-. See text accompanying notes 38-41 infra.
35. 495 F.2d at 734.
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against false or misleading statements made non-negligently or in good
faith."3 6
mI. WHITE V. ABRAMS: A NEW APPROACH?
The Ninth Circuit has been involved in the state of mind controversy
at least since the circuit's often misunderstood decision in Ellis v. Carter.
Recently, however, the court made a comprehensive attempt to clarify
the problem by way of its decision in White v. Abrams. In White,
defendant Abrams, for a commission, solicited loans for the Richmond
corporations (Richmond), operators of bus lines. White gave loans and
purchased stock on the faith of alleged misrepresentations by Abrams to
the effect that Abrams had personally investigated the financial condi-
tion of Richmond and that the corporations were financially sound.
When Richmond collapsed, leaving $58,000,000 in debts outstanding,
White brought suit charging, inter alia,3 7 a violation of rule lOb-5. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of White following an instruction
ordering them to find for the plaintiff if they found that a material
misrepresentation had been made in connection with the sale of securi-
ties, "even if . . . [Abrams] did not know the falsity of the misrepre-
sentation."3 8 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the trial court
erred in giving an instruction which imposed absolute liability: "The
instruction. . . imposes a liability without fault which we find to be
contrary to the basic thrust of the statute and rule."3 0
By way of guidance for retrial and as a suggested approach for courts
to take when faced with a rule IOb-5 case, the court proceeded with the
development of the "flexible duty standard." The court pointed out that
because of the enormous variability and complexity of the factual cir-
cumstances encompassed by rule lOb-5 cases, the application of a
single state of mind standard is unworkable. 40 Consequently, the court
36. 495 F.2d at 728, quoting Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,
280 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972).
37. The complaint also alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970) (fraudulent in-
terstate transactions), and also contained a count for common law fraud. 495 F.2d at
727.
38. Id. at 728.
39. Id. It can be argued that the trial court's instruction did not necessarily impose
strict liability, i.e., the statement that liability will be imposed even if he did not know of
the falsity is an arguably less strict standard than the statement that liability will be
imposed even if he did not know or had no reason to know of the falsity which clearly
imposes absolute liability. However, the argument is weak, and even if valid, the
instruction is unclear and misleading. The court's finding of error was clearly proper.
40. Id. at 734.
[Vol. 9
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rejected scienter, or any other fixed standard that would apply to lOb-5
violations:
The proper standard to be applied is the extent of the duty that Rule
10b-5 imposes on this particular defendant. In making this determina-
tion the court should focus on the goals of the securities fraud legislation
by considering a number of factors that have been found to be signifi-
cant in securities transactions.
41
The court then listed several of these "factors" which include "the
relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff" and "the benefit that the
defendant derives from the relationship. '42 Finally, the court gave ex-
amples of the flexible duty standard in operation:
Where the defendant derives great benefit from a relationship of ex-
treme trust and confidence with the plaintiff. . . the law imposes a duty
upon the defendant to use extreme care in assuring that all material in-
formation is accurate and disclosed. If the defendant has breached his
duty he is liable under Rule lOb-5. . . . On the other hand, where
the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff is so casual that a reason-
ably prudent person would not rely upon it in making investment deci-
sions, the defendant's only duty is not to misrepresent intentionally ma-
terial facts.
43
IV. A WORKABLE SOLUTION
Of the aforementioned approaches to the state of mind issue none has
gained enough support to be considered the accepted position.44 The
state of mind controversy today is more viable than it has ever been;45
41. Id. at 734-35.
42. Id. at 735. Additional factors cited by the court: the defendant's access to the
information as compared to the plaintiff's access; the defendant's awareness of whether
the plaintiff was relying upon their relationship in making his investment decisions; and
the defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction in question. Id. at 735-36.
To these factors, the court in Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
a case involving the liability of a registered representative (the primary defendant) of a
large brokerage firm (the secondary defendant) would add; the relationship between the
plaintiffs and the primary defendant; and the relationship between the primary defend-
ant and the secondary defendant. Id. at 87.
43. 495 F.2d at 736.
44. This situation stems in part from the difficulty in applying a single standard to the
variety of complex fact situations in which a rule lOb-5 violation may occur, the types
of rule lob-5 suits which may be brought, and the types of defendants which may be
charged with a violation. See note 5 supra for the other factors which add to the
confusion regarding the proper standard to be applied.
45. As one commentator notes:
Thirty panel discussions, seventy-five scholarly articles and uncounted cases later,
the great debate rages on. Should a lob-5 defendant's conduct be judged on the
basis of scienter or ordinary negligence or something in between?
1975]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
there remains the need for a workable and practical solution to multiple-
defendant, rule 10b-5 cases. One scholar, Professor Ruder,4" has sug-
gested such a solution which has met with acceptance by several courts
and commentators.
47
Ruder begins his analysis by distinguishing between primary and
secondary defendants. Primary defendants are those who have breached
an independent duty owed by them to the public.48 Under, such a
definition, those who make a material misrepresentation and those who
fail to disclose material information when some special relationship
imposes upon them an affirmative duty to do so, 40 are classified as
primary wrongdoers. Secondary defendants owe no independent duty to
the public and are potentially liable only because some primary defend-
ant has violated such a duty. 0 Thus, those who merely aid and abetu1 or
Mann, supra note 17, at 1206. Mann's article was published in 1970. If that commenta-
tor had had the benefit of foresight he would have been able to expand the number of
"panel discussions," "scholarly articles," and "uncounted cases." For a sampling of some
of the more recent articles dealing with state of mind or scienter in the context of rule
lob-5 liability, see Bucklo, supra note 5; Ruder, supra note 14; Approaching the Scienter
Controversy, supra note 5; Comment, Scienter in Private Damage Actions Under Rule
lOb-5, 57 GEO. LJ. 1108 (1969); Note, The Role of Scienter and the Need to Limit
Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions-The Texas Gulf Sulphur Litigation, 59 Ky. LJ. 891
(1971).
Supportive of the comment that the controversy remains viable in 1974 is a statement
made by Professor Bromberg:
Scienter is the most unsettled element of a plaintiff's [rule lOb-5] case ...
[Mlany of the Circuits-particularly the midwestern and western ones-will find
a violation based on negligence of [sic] constructive knowledge of falsity or omis-
sion. The Second Circuit seemed to be headed that way, but in recent cases has
said very firmly that something more is necessary: at least recklessness or willful-
ness. This important limiting element remains unsettled nationally.
Bromberg, Are There Limits to 10b-5, 29 Bus. LAw. 167, 172 (Special Issue, Mar.
1974) (citations omitted).
46. Ruder, supra note 14.
47. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1315 (6th Cir. 1974); Landy v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974);
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973); Freeman, Opinion Letters
and Professionalism, 1973 DUxr L.J 371, 403; Mann, Prevention of Improper Securities
Transactions by Employees: The Responsibility for and Feasibility of Adopting Preven-
tative Programs, 25 HAsTiGs LJ. 355 (1974). Contra, White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724,
734 (9th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. Ruder, supra note 14, at 600.
49. Individuals who occupy a position of public trust, including corporate directors
and professionals such as attorneys, accountants and brokers, may owe separate duties to
the public arising solely by virtue of their "special relationship." See Ruder, supra note
14, at 641-44. For a further discussion of affirmative duties which arise from such a
relationship and the status of defendants who owe such duties, see text accompanying
notes 82-97, 101, 104-07, 114-16, infra.
50. Ruder, supra note 14, at 600.
51. The key elements necessary to establish liability as an aider and abettor of a rule
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conspire52 to commit a rule lOb-5 violation are classified as secondary
wrongdoers,
An example of this distinction may prove helpful. Assume a business
promoter sells securities to investors and in so doing defrauds them.
Further, assume that the promotor acquired financing for the scheme
through a lending institution and enlisted the services of an accountant
to prepare a financial statement for presentation to the investors. If a
rule lOb-5 suit is brought by the defrauded investors, the promotor,
because his scheme was the basis for the fraud, would be a primary
defendant. The lending institution, if joined, would be a secondary
defendant since its liability, e.g., on an aiding and abetting theory, arises
only because of the primary wrongdoing. The accountant could possibly
be a primary or secondary defendant. If the accountant had prepared an
accurate and complete financial statement which was used by the pro-
moter in carrying out the fraud then the accountant, like the lending
institution, would be a secondary defendant, liable only because of the
primary wrongdoing. If, however, the accountant had prepared a false
or incomplete statement which itself acted to deceive the investors, then,
because the accountant had an independent duty to make full and
accurate disclosure, a breach of that duty would result in primary
liability.
The second step in Professor Ruder's analysis distinguishes the
knowledge requirement essential to establish secondary liability from the
requirement which will suffice for primary defendants. Policy considera-
tions mandate that for primary defendants, a negligence or should have
known standard rather than scienter is proper. Secondary defendants, on
the other hand, should be subject to liability only when, in assisting or
agreeing to take part in the primary defendant's wrongdoing, they acted
knowingly or in reckless disregard of the truth.53
10b-5 violation are: (1) a rule 10b-5 violation committed by some other party, (2)
knowledge by the aider and abettor of the illegal act, and (3) substantial assistance by
the aider and abettor in that wrong. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d
139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); RESTATEMMNT oF TORTS
§ 876 (1934) ("For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, a person is liable if he . . . (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other .... ").
52. The key elements necessary to establish civil liability under rule 10b-5 for
conspiracy are: (1) the existence of independent wrong, (2) the conspirator's knowledge
of the illegal scheme, and (3) an agreement between the primary defendant and the
conspirator to bring about the wrongful act. See Ruder, supra note 14, at 630.
53. Id. at 632-33.
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Although elimination of a scienter requirement in order to establish vio-
lation [sic] by the primary participant may be urged upon the grounds
that maximum protection of investors will be provided by requiring ex-
ercise of care when engaging in activities that might injure others, dif-
ferent considerations enter into eliminating scienter as an element of aid-
ing and abetting or conspiracy and substituting a duty of inquiry or a
"should have known" standard. In most cases, the alleged aider and
abettor (or conspirator) will merely be engaging in customary business
activities, such as loaning money, managing a corporation, preparing fi-
nancial statements, distributing press releases, completing brokerage
transactions, or giving legal advice. If each of these parties will be re-
quired to investigate the ultimate activities of the party whom he is as-
sisting a burden may be imposed upon business activities that is too
great.
51
Professor Ruder's approach to the state of mind problem seems
theoretically sound and practically workable, especially in complex cases
involving multiple defendants." As regards primary defendants, his
suggestion that elimination of scienter would not be unduly harsh com-
ports with the Supreme Courts position that "[s]ection 10(b) must
be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively," 50 "to effectuate its
remedial purpose." 57 It also comports with the current trend towards
eliminating the elements of common law fraud as necessary for a rule
lOb-5 violation.58
V. A CRITIQUE OF WHITE v. ABRAMS AND THE
FLEXIBLE DUTY STANDARD
The foregoing discussion of the various approaches to the state of
mind issue was intended to provide an understanding of the parameters
of the problem. Given such a background, White's "flexible duty stan-
dard" and the limits of its application may be adequately defined.
54. Id.
55. Professor Ruder's approach is especially helpful in determining liability and allo-
cating rights among the various wrongdoers. For a comprehensive analysis of this prob-
lem of contribution, indemnification and in pari delicto, see id. at 646 et seq.
56. Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
57. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). Although
the Court was referring specifically to the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, the
statement expressly covered all securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding
fraud (which, of course, encompasses rule 10b-5).
58. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974); Affiliated Uto
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (actual reliance need not be shown);
text accompanying notes 27-32 supra. See generally 2 BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 8.1, at
8.9.
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At first reading, White appears to provide that which it intended and
purported to provide, that is, a unique approach to the state of mind
problem with broad application. However, while the court's opinion is
sound and workable in the circumstances of that particular case, the
standard suggested in White is not unique, nor does the opinion cover
the whole range of rule IOb-5 defendants. Furthermore, the court's
rather startling and somewhat confusing statement that "we reject scien-
ter or any other discussion of state of mind as a necessary and separate
element of a lOb-5 action," 59 is likely to add to, rather than reduce, the
confusion surrounding the state of mind requirement. Finally, the
court's general language regarding the proper approach to rule lOb-5
cases60 can be expected to provide little guidance in complex cases
involving multiple defendants.
In the absence of specific language by the White court defining the
"flexible duty standard," the court's examples of its standard in opera-
tion are helpful in understanding the approach. The court gave two
such examples: one, where the defendant derives great benefit from his
fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff, and the other, where the rela-
tionship is so casual that the plaintiff could not reasonably rely on de-
fendant in making his investment decisions."- In the first example, the
court noted that the relationship is such that the defendant owes a high
degree of care to assure that no material misrepresentations are made.
In the other example, the plaintiff's reliance on defendant's representa-
tions being unreasonable, the defendant's only duty is not to misrepre-
sent intentionally.
6 2
The Ninth Circuit suggests that the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant and the extent to which the plaintiff relies on the
defendant in making investment decisions are determinative of the
degree of care which the defendant must exercise to avoid liability under
the Rule. In short, the court's "flexible duty standard" is nothing more
than a call for due care under the circumstances. When one is reminded
that in applying a negligence standard the degree of care or duty owed
will also vary with the circumstances, the court's statement, expressly
rejecting a negligence standard, is tempered, if not contradicted. The
contention that the White approach closely parallels the "negligence
theory"68 is supported by the observation that both approaches reach the
59. 495 F.2d at 734.
60. Id. at 735.
61. Id. at 736.
62. Id.
63. See text accompanying notes 23-29 supra.
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same conclusions when applied to the two examples given by the White
court.
Applying a negligence standard to the court's first example, where the
defendant owes a high degree of care due to his position of extreme
trust, the defendant will be subject to liability for a misrepresentation
if it can be shown that a reasonable person, occupying the same position
of extreme trust, would not have made such a statement. The duty im-
posed and the liability for breach are the same under each approach.
As to the court's second example, where the relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant is so casual that no reasonable person would rely
on defendant's representations, the defendant could not be held liable
under conventional principles of negligence since the plaintiff could not
"justifiably" rely on such information. 4 This does not mean, however,
that the defendant would escape liability under the "negligence theory."
Those who argue for the application of that theory have not abandoned
actual knowledge of fraud as a possible basis for liability under the
Rule. Proponents of such a theory have merely suggested that, in the
interest of providing maximum protection to the investing public, negli-
gence should suffice for liability where actual knowledge is absent.0 5
Thus, although liability in this example may not rest on mere negli-
gence, liability may nevertheless be imposed under the "negligence
theory" for intentional or fraudulent misrepresentations against which
justifiable reliance is not a defense. 6 The conclusion reached by apply-
ing the "negligence theory" is thus consistent with the conclusion
reached when applying the "flexible duty" standard.
As regards the scope of White and the "flexible duty standard" a
strong argument can be made that the decision applies only to primary
defendants, notwithstanding the court's implication that the scope of the
opinion covers all wrongdoers, primary and secondary alike.07 First,
64. RFSTATEMENT OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966) provides:
(a) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or a trans-
action in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guid-
ance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exer-
cise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information
(emphasis added).
65. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
66. RESTATEMeNT OF TORTS § 531 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) provides:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss
(a) to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect
to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation ....
(emphasis added).
67. By adopting such a duty analysis, we avoid the confusion that arises from clas-
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Abrams was a primary wrongdoer. He had allegedly breached a direct
duty to White by making the false statements himself. Thus, application
of the flexible duty standard to secondary defendants, if possible, must
be by way of dicta. Second, it may reasonably be assumed that the two
examples given by the court to demonstrate the operation of the White
standard are at the extreme ends of the spectrum of relationships with
which the court was dealing. The defendants, as illustrated in those
examples, are communicators of the false information; it is their repre-
sentations on which the plaintiffs are relying. This circumstance identi-
fies primary wrongdoers only."" Third, the effective thrust of White, in
fact its express holding, is the creation of a standard which looks solely
to the defendants duty. Secondary defendants, by definition, owe no
independent duty to a plaintiff; their liability arises solely because the
primary defendant has breached such a duty. None of the courfs factors
or examples provide guidance for determining the state of mind stan-
dard to be applied where no independent duty runs from the defendant
to plaintiff, such as, for example, where a bank has lent money to a
primary defendant. Only the very broadest reading of White could have
applicability to such a case.
Although the scope of the White opinion and its flexible duty stan-
dard appears limited to cases involving only primary liability, the court's
approach as to primary defendants is not unsound. Except for the
possible confusion which may result from the court's rather general
language, White can be expected to provide reasonable guidance in
cases involving primary liability. 9 As to suits involving secondary, as
sifying the defendants as primary and secondary, or from classifying the transac-
tions as direct and indirect.
495 F.2d at 734.
68. Persons who make representations or omissions are properly classified as primary
defendants, never secondary defendants. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
69. See Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974), decided
some eight months after White. In Marx, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) made
an optimistic earnings forecast under circumstances not justifying such optimism. Addi-
tionally, CSC failed to disclose in its forecast that one of its projects, previously
represented to the public as being currently expensed, was in fact still capitalized. Marx,
following the release of the forecast, purchased shares in CSC. The forecast proved
incorrect-the difference between the predicted earnings figure and the actual figure
arising largely from the writeoff of the project which CSC had, unknowingly to the
public, not included in its forecast. Marx brought suit under rule lob-5 alleging damages
resulting from a false and misleading forecast. The district court granted summary
judgment for CSC.
The Ninth Circuit, recognizing that a financial forecast is essentially an opinion and
that "'a reasoned and justified statement of opinion, one with a sound factual or
historical basis, is not actionable,'" (id. at 490, quoting G & M, Inc. v. Newbern, 488
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well as primary defendants, the approach suggested by Professor Ruder
provides a practical method for determining liability.
VI. A WORKABLE SOLUTION IN OPERATION
The most encouraging observation regarding Ruder's approach is that
it produces results consistent with those reached by the courts in dealing
with rule lOb-5 cases. Even though several courts have stated that they
reject Ruder's analysis,7 ° they have nevertheless applied a standard
consistent with it.71 This apparent contradiction is explained in part by
F.2d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1973)) looked to White for guidance on the question of what
fault is necessary to establish CSC's liability. In vacating and remanding, the court
applied the flexible duty standard, and found that "the great importance attached to an
earnings forecast, CSC's knowledge that investors would heavily rely thereon, and the
disparity between the parties in access to the information necessary to judge the accuracy
of the forecast," (id.) could give rise to a duty on CSC's part not to ignore facts which
could seriously affect the forecast. Although the court concluded that the record would
not prove that the forecast was intentionally or knowingly false, it could not "agree that
CSC. . . was justifiably optimistic in its prediction and hence that the same may not be
found actionably 'untrue."' (Id.) It is believed that Marx correctly applied the "flexible
duty standard" in assessing the duty owed by CSC, a primary defendant. It is to be noted
that an application of the negligence standard, given CSC's duty of care under the
circumstances, would lead to the same result reached in Marx. See also Clark v.
Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1975) and Robinson v. Cupples Container Co.,
513 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1975) for other instances where the Ninth Circuit has
applied its flexible duty standard in analyzing the liability of primary defendants. For a
complex Ninth Circuit case involving both primary and secondary defendants, see
Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1974), a case decided the same day
that a petition for rehearing White was denied. Applying the "flexible duty standard" of
White in determining the liability of the primary defendant in Jackson, the court
concluded that the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiffs was so casual
that no duty ran from him to the plaintiffs. Since, additionally, there was no evidence of
actual knowledge on this defendant's part, the court refused to find liability. Id. at 93.
Having found no violation by the primary defendant, the court's analysis of secondary
liability was unnecessary since secondary defendants are liable only if a primary
violation is proved. Furthermore, the court's then perfunctory examination of secondary
liability was restricted to the "controlling persons" section of § 20 of the 1934 Act (15
U.S.C. § 78t (1970)), the court concluding that that section provides the exclusive
method of imposing liability on secondary defendants. 381 F. Supp. at 95. This
conclusion is unfortunate for two reasons. First, neither the SEC nor the courts have
been content to rest secondary liability on the controlling persons sections. Rather, these
sections are likely to be relied on only when necessary to impose liability. Ruder, supra
note 14, at 601, 609. Second, by relying exclusively on section 20, which imposes liability
on controlling persons for mere negligence, the court missed its chance to apply White's
flexible duty standard, if applicable, to secondary defendants, or to reach the conclusion,
expressed herein, that secondary liability, based on an aiding and abetting or conspiracy
theory, requires scienter.
70. See sources cited in note 47 supra.
71. See notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text.
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the fact that proper application of the theory requires a complete
understanding of the distinction between primary and secondary defend-
ants and the appropriate knowledge standards to be applied to each. An
analysis of several leading rule 10b-5 cases serves to illustrate the
application and test the practicality of Professor Ruder's approach to
liability under the Rule.
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,72 a case deal-
ing with liability of aiders and abettors, Dobich Securities Corp., trans-
fer agent and broker for Midwestern, and Dobich's president, Michael
Dobich, were dealing in a fraudulent manner with money acquired from
purchasers of Midwestern stock. When Midwestern became aware of
these activities, through complaints from stock purchasers who had not
yet received their stock, Midwestern merely notified Mr. Dobich, warn-
ing him to cease such activity. Having found that Midwestern had actual
knowledge of Dobich's illegal activities, 73 the Seventh Circuit went on to
find that Midwestern's notice to Dobich, in lieu of a letter to the SEC,
was a signal to Dobich to arrange for delivery of the shares and to
thereby satisfy the stock purchaser's complaints. The court found that
this action encouraged Dobich and substantially aided and abetted him
in the continuation of his fraudulent activities without fear of a report
from Midwestern to the SEC.74 As to the contention that Midwestern's
failure to inform the SEC of the improper activities was in itself enough
to constitute aiding and abetting, the court held that silence plus the
affirmative act of notifying Dobich was a form of aiding and abetting
cognizable under the Rule.75
Applying Professor Ruder's approach, Midwestern's status was prop-
erly analyzed as that of an aider and abettor since its liability arose only
because Dobich had violated the law; that is, Midwestern itself did not
owe any direct duty to the public. Although the lower court decision in
Brennan7 6 may be cited for the proposition that in some circumstances
silence or inaction alone may constitute aiding and abetting,77 it is
important to note that the Seventh Circuit refused to take such a strong
position holding that "Midwestern's. . .silence. . . combined with its
72. 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
73. Id. at 151.
74. Id. at 153.
75. Id. at 154.
76. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
77. Id. at 680-82. The trial court refused "to hold blindly that silence and inaction
cannot constitute aiding and abetting under any possible set of circumstances . . . ." Id.
at 682.
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affirmative acts was a form of aiding and abetting cognizable under
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. ' 78 It is suggested that mere inaction or
silence should never give rise to rule lOb-5 liability in the absence of an
affirmative duty arising out of some special relationship. 0 If such a duty
does exist, resort to a theory of secondary liability, such as aiding and
abetting, is unnecessary since direct breach of a duty results in primary
liability." Having concluded that Midwestern's involvement in the
wrongdoing was only secondary, the court's finding that liability should
be imposed by reason of the fact that Midwestern had actual knowledge
of Dobich's illegal scheme is consistent with Professor Ruder's sugges-
tion that as to secondary defendants, scienter should be the appropriate
.78, 417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (emphasis
added).
79. Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 161 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) ("It is notable that the court in Brennan relied on silence
. . . plus affirmative costs [sic]. . . . In the absence of a special relationship between
the parties, no case has come to our attention imposing liability on the basis of 'mero
inaction.'"); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971).
80. A superficial reading of Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 909 (1975), may result in a conclusion that the court in
that case takes a contrary position since it proceeded under what it termed to be a
secondary theory in assessing the plaintiff's claim that inaction alone may suffice for
rule 10b-5 liability. ("[A] claim for aiding and abetting solely by inaction can be
maintained under Rule lOb-5. . . ." Id. at 1104.) However, the court's statement that a
claim for "aiding and abetting" is made on demonstrating that the defendant breached a
duty of inquiry owing to the plaintiff evidences the true nature of the court's theory of
liability. Id. Under the definitions of primary and secondary theories of liability as used
in this Note, the Hocifelder court has proceeded under a theory of primary liability, i.e.,
the defendant's liability is based on its direct breach of an independent duty, and not on
some other primary wrongdoer's breach. The conclusion reached by the Hochtelder
court, that is, that liability here may be based on breach of a duty of inquiry, is
consistent with this author's contention that negligence is a sufficient basis for liability as
to primary defendants.
One circumstance in which a primary/secondary analysis creates confusion is the sit-
uation where an affirmative duty does not arise until the one to be charged has actual
knowledge of the primary violator's breach. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d
Cir. 1973), held that a director who has not participated in negotiations during which
misstatements are made is not subject to liability absent actual knowledge of the viola-
tion. The court implied that where actual knowledge is found an affirmative duty of dis-
closure may arise. Id. at 1306. Similarly, SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974),
refused to impose an affirmative duty on non-participating directors and officers to in-
sure that others are making full disclosure. Id. at 1315. However, once actual knowl-
edge is found the court there concludes that "failure to take remedial action would
be a form of aiding and abetting." Id. at 1316. Professor Ruder's conclusion would seem
to require that once having found an affirmative duty, any liability rests on a primary
rather than a secondary theory. However, the question of which theory is appropriate in
this circumstance appears purely academic as regards the proper standard of knowledge
to be applied since, by definition, the duty does not arise until actual knowledge is found.,
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state of mind standard."1
In Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,"2 the Second Circuit specifically examined
the duty of an "outside' director to convey material information to those
who are dealing with "his" corporation. The plaintiffs, who had ex-
changed shares of Victor Billiard Company stock for shares of BarChris
Construction Company stock pursuant to a merger, sued certain officers
and directors of BarChris alleging that the plaintiffs had been misled by
material misrepresentations and omissions regarding BarChris' financial
position and outlook. Coleman, an "outside" director, had neither par-
ticipated in the negotiations nor did he have actual knowledge of any
misstatements. The Second Circuit stated:
[A] director in his capacity as director (a nonparticipant in the transac-
tion) owes no duty to insure that all material, adverse information is
conveyed to prospective purchasers of the stock of the corporation on
whose board he sits. A director's liability to prospective purchasers un-
der Rule lOb-5 can thus only be secondary, such as that of an aider
and abettor, a conspirator, or a substantial participant in fraud perpe-
trated by others.83
Absent knowledge or substantial participation we have refused to im-
pose such affirmative duties of disclosure upon 'Rule lOb-5 defendants. 84
Coleman neither participated in nor knew of the misstatements and
thus, under the court's rule, he had no duty to scrutinize the negotiations
and convey all material facts. Absent an affirmative duty, Coleman's
inaction alone could not subject him to liability. 5
The Second Circuit next turned to the state of mind issue and the
plaintiffs contention that even absent an affirmative duty Coleman
was liable since he knew many "disquieting" facts about BarChris
which would have led a reasonable person to discover the 'fraud.86
Recognizing that other circuits had approved of a negligence standard,
the court nevertheless stated that it rejected such a standard, 7 pointing
out that in the Second Circuit 'facts amounting to scienter, intent to
81. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
82. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
83. Id. at 1289, citing Ruder, supra note 14.
84. Id. at 1302.
85. See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text. See also note 80 supra for a
discussion of which theory of liability is applicable where an affirmative duty does not
arise until one has actual knowledge.
86. 479 F.2d at 1304.
87. Id. at 1305.
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defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device,
scheme or artifice to defraud' " are essential to a rule 1 Ob-5 violation.88
In some respects the majority's decision in Lanza is unclear.8 The
case has been cited frequently for the broad proposition that no rule
lOb-5 violation can occur in the absence of scienter and that mere
negligence is not enoughY0 It is not surprising that such a contention
has been made since Lanza stated that scienter is an essential element in
the Second Circuit. However, this statement must not be taken out of
context. Following this "scienter" comment, the court stated:
We recognize that participation by a director in the dissemination of
false information reasonably calculated to influence the investing public
may subject such a director to liability under the Rule. But it is quite a
different matter to hold a director liable . . . for failing to insure that
all material, adverse information is conveyed to prospective purchasers
...absent substantial participation in the concealment or knowledge
of it. Absent knowledge or substantial participation we have refused
to impose such affirmative duties of disclosure upon Rule 10b-5 de-
fendants. 91
This statement suggests that the court did not intend to extend the
scienter standard (actual knowledge) to a case involving a director who
substantially participates in the dissemination of false information. In
that circumstance, the statement here implies that an affirmative duty to
insure full disclosure could exist even absent actual knowledge and,
presumably, a negligent breach of that duty would be sufficient for
liability.
In summary, Lanza v. Drexel is an important case that should not be
so broadly interpreted as to suggest applicability to cases involving
primary liability. The case may be cited for the proposition that absent
knowledge or substantial participation, "outside" directors have no af-
firmative duty to insure that all material information is conveyed to
purchasers of company stock. Absent a direct duty owed to the public,
liability may only be imposed through application of theories of second-
88. Id. at 1301, quoting Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445
(2d Cir. 1971); accord, Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
89. Approaching the Scienter Controversy, supra note 5, at 553.
90. Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1145 n.13 (2d Cir. 1974); White v. Abrams,
495 F.2d 724, 733 (9th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); 5 ST. MARY L.J. 382, 389 (1973).
91. 479 F.2d at 1302 (emphasis added in part).
[Vol. 9
NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
ary liability. 2 Under such a theory, scienter is essential. 3 The court's
analysis is thus consistent with, and reaches the same result as, Professor
Ruder's approach, i.e., Coleman was a secondary defendant who es-
caped liability because he had no actual knowledge of the fraud.
Two recent, factually unique, enforcement proceedings examine the
state of mind requirement to be applied to different types of defendants
in complex rule 10b-5 cases. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.94 involved a suit
for injunctive relief against all parties to an illicit scheme to distribute
unregistered securities. At the request of one of the promoters of the
scheme, Schiffman, an attorney, issued an opinion which listed the
names of those who could and those who could not sell their unregis-
tered shares in a transaction exempt from securities registration require-
ments. The trial court9 5 found there was no evidence that any unregis-
tered stock had been sold on the basis of Schiffman's letter. Recognizing
that Schiffman might still be liable as an aider and abettor, the court
held that liability would be imposed only if Schiffman had actual
knowledge of the illegal scheme. However, since no evidence had been
produced to sustain such a conclusion, the trial court refused to issue a
preliminary injunction against Schiffman. On appeal the Second Circuit
disapproved of an actual knowledge standard in assessing the liability of
secondary defendants. As to 'this standard, the court stated that it is
.. . a sharp and unjustified departure from the negligence standard
which we have repeatedly held to be sufficient in the context of enforce-
ment proceedings seeking equitable or prophylactic relief." 96 Disapprov-
ing of Professor Ruder's statement that imposition of a negligence
standard as to secondary defendants places too great a burden on the
business activities of such individuals, the court commented that an
attorney's opinion "is too essential and the reliance of the public too
high to permit due diligence to be cast aside in the name of conve-
nience.
'97
Notwithstanding the courts express disapproval of some of Ruder's
comments, a close analysis of the decision reveals that Ruder's theory
may not have been rejected. First, the court emphasized that its deci-
92. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
93. For the elements of a rule lOb-5 case based on secondary theories see notes 50-52
supra.
94. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
95. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 54 F.R.D. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
96. Id. at 541; accord, SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d
Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
97. 489 F.24 at 542.
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sion to impose liability for negligent conduct is to be construed nar-
rowly and should not be applied to more "peripheral participants" in
an illegal scheme. 98 This clearly seems to indicate the court would not
impose such a duty as to secondary defendants. Second, it is arguable
that Schiffman was only secondarily liable. The court's comments to
the effect that the "public trust" demands more of attorneys rendering
opinions than "customary activities which prove to be careless"09 implies
that attorneys, in such a circumstance, owe some duty to potential
investors. 100 Where one breaches a direct duty owed to the public,
liability is based on theories of primary not secondary liability.'01
Although the court in Spectrum labeled Schiffman an "aider and
abettor", the "duty" language used by the court in rationalizing its de-
98. The court stated:
We could not conclude without emphasizing that the standard of culpability we
find appropriate for the author of an opinion letter in an action for injunctive relief
only should not be construed to apply to more peripheral participants in an illicit
scheme or, for that matter, to criminal prosecutions or private suits for damages.
489 F.2d at 542.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975), demonstrates that the court's reluctance to apply Spectrum
to any case except one confined to the very limited factual circumstance illustrated
therein. The Sixth Circuit commented:
,We do not believe that this application of a negligence standard to that situation
[Spectrum] compels us to apply a negligence standard in the very different case
we confront. Here, there must be some showing that Appellants were aware of the
[primary defendants'] alleged misrepresentations.
Id. at 1316 n.30.
99. 489 F.2d at 542.
100. The court suggests that this duty might be to investigate the activities of the
party he is assisting and, where such an investigation is inexpedient, to stamp on the face
of the letter that the opinion is not to be used in the sale of unregistered securities. Id.
101. Ruder, supra note 14, at 618. Professor Ruder has stated:
Attention to separate duties owed by professionals such as accountants and brokers
emphasizes that in a complicated case involving numerous defendants, liability may
be imposed without resort to secondary liability theories if the existence of an inde-
pendent duty to the public by virtue of special professional status can be shown.
Id. If a duty could arise out of an accountant's or a broker's professional status, surely an
attorney, under the proper circumstances, could be held to some duty for which he could
be subject to rule lOb-5 liability for failure to properly perform.
In Spectrum, defendant Schiffman occupied a status and had a duty similar to the
defendant-accountants in Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In
Fischer, the court acknowledged the possible liability of accountants who knew that their
previously filed financial statements, relied on by the public, were no longer accurate.
The court proceeded with an analysis based on a theory of primary liability, i.e., in such
a circumstance the defendant owed a direct duty to the investing public. The status of
the defendant-CPA in Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971) differed from
that of the defendants in Spectrum and Fischer. In Wessel, the primary wrongdoers had
altered the figures prepared by the CPA. Because the figures used by the primary wrong-
doer to perpetrate his fraud were not certified by the CPA, the CPA had no independent
duty to warn of their inaccuracy. Hence, liability could not be based on any "primary"
theory.
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cision seems to indicate that they proceeded on a theory of primary
rather than secondary liability. This is supported by the fact that the
court applied the knowledge standard (i.e., negligence) generally con-
sidered appropriate as against primary wrongdoers only.
In SEC v. Coffey, 102 the Sixth Circuit took the opportunity to com-
prehensively analyze primary/secondary liability under rule 10b-5.
There, King Resources sold its own two-year notes to the State of Ohio
through a professional "money-finder." Coffey, the company's financial
vice-president, was involved in the transaction to the extent that he gave
financial information to a credit rating agency and discussed the terms
of the loan with the "money-finder." King, the company's chairman of
the board, was involved merely to the extent that he attended the
board meetings which had authorized the loans. Neither King nor
Coffey had any direct dealings with the State of Ohio. After securing
the loans, King Resources collapsed. The SEC brought an action to en-
join defendants, including Coffey, King and the "money-finder." This
injunction was sought to prevent violations of securities laws including,
inter alia, rule IOb-5. The gravamen of the SEC complaint alleged , that
the defendants had failed to disclose material facts concerning the
company's financial position and the intended use of the loan
proceeds-omissions which were intended to mislead the credit rating
agency and the State of Ohio.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's holding'0 3 that the defen-
dants had violated rule 10b-5 by using the word "prime" to secure the
loans.' 0 4 The court reasoned that since all parties understood the use of
the term, no party was misled. 0 5 However, the court intimated that
conduct of defendants, other than the use of the word "prime," could be
a basis for liability. In giving guidance for disposition on remand, the
court suggested an examination of both primary and secondary theories
of liability. The court stated that Coffey, who had personally sent
financial information to the credit agency, could be found "primarily"
liable under -the rule 10b-5 if "he omitted material facts necessary to
make the statements made to NCO (the credit rating agency> not
misleading."' 06 To sustain Coffey's liability on a primary theory it would
be necessary to "prove that the alleged omissions represent facts which
102. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
103. SEC v. Coffey, 351 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
104. Id. at 254.
105. 493 F.2d at 1313.
106. Id. at 1314.
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were known or should have been known by Coffey ....
Although this language is generally used by the courts in applying
a negligence or constructive knowledge standard of liability, the court
apparently did not intend to impose such a standard for, immediately
following the comment, the court stated that "[i]n addition . . . it is
essential. . . that Coffey's inaction was in 'wilful or reckless disregard
for the truth.'"108 Such language is not properly associated with a
negligence or constructive knowledge standard but is readily identified
as a form of scienter.'09 The court's rejection of the negligence standard
and effective retention of scienter as requisite for liability under rule
lOb-5 is unfortunate and surprising. First, the court was suggesting a
standard in the context of primary liability. Second, numerous courts
have held that, in enforcement proceedings, mere negligence will suffice
not only as to primary defendants but secondary wrongdoers as well."10
In regard to the issue of Coffey's primary liability for the misrepresen-
tations made to the State of Ohio, and King's primary liability for the
misrepresentations made to the State and NCO, the court concluded that
the defendants, not having participated in the negotiations or misrepre-
sentations, could not be found primarily liable absent an affirmative
duty imposed on the defendants as either an officer or director to
investigate and supervise the activities in which fraud may be occur-
ring."' The court stated:
We refuse to impose such a duty. Our refusal is in accordance with
other decisions which have declined to impose duties on persons not in
a special relationship with a buyer or seller of securities. 112
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., text accompanying note 53 supra.
110. Defendant King, like Coleman in Lanza, was a director who had not participated
in the negotiations. In both cases, the court of appeals found no affirmative duty to
convey. If the defendant had participated in the transaction, then "[a] duty to disclose
naturally devolved on those who had direct contacts with 'the other side.'" 493 F.2d at
1315. This statement is similar to the Second Circuit's comment in Lanza that participa-
tion by a director may subject him to liability under the Rule. 479 F.2d at 1302.
111. 493 F.2d at 1315.
112. Id., citing Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Mader v. Armel,
461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d
Cir. 1968).
The Sixth Circuit bounced back into the scienter controversy by making the statement
that, having found no direct duty owed by King or Coffey, "we need not reach the
thorny general question whether ... scienter must be shown ... or whether mere
negligence . .. suffices ...... 493 F.2d at 1315 n.25. It must be concluded, notwith-
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Thus the Sixth Circuit refused to acknowledge a special relationship
between non-participating officers and directors of a corporation and
purchasers of the corporation's securities.
113
Recognizing that an analysis of King's and Coffey's liability would be
incomplete without a discussion of theories of secondary liability, the
court then dealt with the "aiding and abetting" issue, i.e., whether King
and/or Coffey aided and abetted in any deception which the money-
finder may have perpetrated on the State of Ohio. The court, citing
Professor Ruder's article, held that scienter was a necessary element for
liability of one aiding and abetting under rule 10b-5.114 Since there was
no evidence to sustain a findiug that King knew of or assisted in the
money-finder's deception, the court concluded that he should not be
held liable.115
As to Coffey, if it was found that through his contact with the money-
finder he became aware of the deception, "his knowledge that a viola-
tion was occurring would be established and his failure to take remedial
action would be a form of aiding and abetting"' . . .. Inaction may be
a form of assistance in certain cases . . . where it is shown that the
silence of the accused aider and abettor was consciously intended to aid
the securities law violation." 1 7 Although the court cited Professor Rud-
er's article," 8 as well as Brennan v. Midwestern,"9 and other cases, 2'
for its contention that inaction can be a form of aiding and abetting, it is
arguable that those cases stand for that proposition,' 2' while Professor
Ruder expressly rejects such an idea.' 22 If Coffey had learned of the
deception he would have been in a position similar to that of Midwest-
standing contradictory language in the opinion, that the issue is undecided in the Sixth
Circuit.
113. Accord, Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
114. 493 F.2d at 1316.
115. Id. at 1318.
116. Id. at 1316.
117. Id. at 1317. The contention made by the court here is similar to that made by the
Seventh Circuit in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (1974), cert. granted, 421
U.S. 909 (1975). The court's holding is discussed at note 80 supra.
118. Ruder, supra note 14, at 641-44.
119. 417 F.2d 147, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
120. Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F.
Supp. 180, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
121. Both Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971) and Fischer v. Kletz, 266
F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) involved the issue of an accountant's liability, and indicate
that inaction alone may be sufficient only in those circumstances in which the defendant
has a duty to act. See note 101 supra for a further discussion of these cases.
122. See text accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
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ern in Brennan. There the court specifically left open the question of
whether inaction alone might constitute aiding and abetting.
123
CONCLUSION
Securities fraud litigation, specifically Rule lOb-5, is a difficult area
of law. As regards the controversial state of mind issue, the courts are
desperately in need of some practical guidelines. Although White v.
Abram's "flexible duty standard" is sound, it is limited to cases deal-
ing with primary liability only. Until the Supreme Court takes the
initiative and formulates some meaningful standards with broad appli-
cability, 24 the primary/secondary approach suggested herein provides a
reasonable method with which to analyze a complex, multiple defendant
suit, sort out the liabilities, and allocate the rights among the various
defendants.
Richard Gebo Morris
123. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); accord, Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d
139, 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
124. It is possible that such a resolution by the Supreme 'Court may occur in
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 909
(1975), a rule lob-5 case involving a claim that defendant-accountants breached a duty
of inquiry owing to the plaintiffs and thereby permitted a fraud to be perpetrated on
plaintiffs. This case gives the Court the opportunity to clarify the distinctions between
primary and secondary defendants and to set forth the state of mind standards to be
applied to each. Under the approach suggested herein, the accountants in Hochifelder
occupy the status of primary defendants and conventional principles of negligence should
thus be applied in determining their liability. See note 80 supra.
[Vol. 9
